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1.  Introduction  
This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interface between globalisation 
and labour standards by focussing on the effects of employment protection on the 
international location of economic activity.   
The past decade has witnessed a remarkable acceleration of the process of integration of the 
world economy – often referred to as ‘globalisation’.  The liberalisation of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) policies worldwide, which has resulted in investment flows between 
countries growing much faster than trade flows, has led to an increase in the ease with 
which firms (and jobs) move across national borders.  As a result, governments’ rhetoric 
and policies increasingly betray concerns about their countries’ ability to prevent domestic 
industry from relocating abroad and to attract and/or retain foreign investment.   
Labour market institutions are commonly regarded as playing a crucial role in determining 
the location of economic activity, not least if they influence the flexibility with which firms 
can adjust output scale and employment levels to evolving economic conditions. 
Employment protection laws in particular are identified as a major source of inflexibility 
and, increasingly, recommendations are put forward that the state-mandated redundancy 
payments – which were introduced in many European countries from the late 1950s to the 
early 1970s – are dismantled. The emerging consensus is that by forcing firms to under-
produce during economic booms and over-produce when the economy slows down1, high 
hiring and firing costs undermine their ability to adapt to fast changing competitive 
markets. Not only is employment protection held responsible for the poor employment 
performance of many European countries (e.g. Lindbeck and Snower, 1988; and Lazear, 
1990) but also for hindering countries’ ability to hold on to footloose industries.  It follows 
that, in a world where countries perceive themselves as being engaged in fierce competition 
for economic activity, the substantial differences that exist between economies (even within 
the European Union) in hiring and firing restrictions2 are seen as a source of unfair 
‘competitive advantage’ for those locations with lower costs of employment adjustments.  
                                                 
1 Bentolila and Bertola (1990) argue that firing costs are likely to have reduced employment variation in 
Europe. 
2 According to Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), firing costs have ranged from 0.48 months salary in 
Denmark to 5.24 in France and even to 15.86 in Italy.  
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Whilst a substantial amount of work has been carried out to assess the impact of hiring and 
firing restrictions on employment3, to our knowledge (and despite its prominence in policy 
debates) the flexibility offered to firms by a given location in adjusting to changing 
economic conditions4 has received relatively little attention in the theoretical literature on 
FDI5.  Instead, the study of industry location has tended to focus on market access and local 
costs of production as the central determinants of a country’s ability to attract FDI and 
retain domestic firms6. These factors are of course important.  However, by focusing on the 
relationship between employment protection and the location of industry this paper fills an 
important gap in the literature. To explore this relationship, we combine ideas from the 
industrial organisation and the labour literature, and apply these to a set-up in which firms’ 
locations are endogenous. 
We argue that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, labour market inflexibility may not 
necessarily hinder a country’s ability to attract and/or retain economic activity. This view 
finds theoretical support in the theory of industrial organisation that emphasises how 
commitment (i.e. inflexibility) may be a source of strategic advantage (Tirole, 1988). We 
shall therefore investigate how region-specific flexibility affects location decisions when 
firms are oligopolistic and act strategically. In a non-strategic set-up, flexibility only entails 
advantages for a firm.  This is not necessarily true when firms act strategically, since 
flexibility then implies lack of commitment power.  Firms producing in locations where 
                                                 
3 Hiring and firing restrictions are typically not found to have a decisive role on overall rates of 
unemployment (e.g. Nickell (1998)).   
4 Firm flexibility in terms of “locational portfolio diversification” has been examined in the literature.  More 
specifically, the role of cost and exchange rate uncertainty in providing a rationale for setting up plants in 
different countries has been respectively studied in de Meza and Van der Ploeg (1987) and in Sung and Lapan 
(2000). 
5 Cooke (1997) finds evidence that host countries’ restrictive legislation governing layoffs have had a 
negative effect on US foreign direct investment abroad.  Moran (1998, p.89) summarises evidence from 
investor surveys and mentions labour regulations, in particular “flexibility in hiring and laying off workers”, 
as one of the main concerns for firm location in economies of transition and developing economies.  A 
cursory look at available data (UNCTAD, 2001), however, does not seem to support the conventional wisdom 
that employment protection is unambiguously inimical to inward FDI.  Amongst the European countries with 
higher than average values of the employment protection index constructed by Nickell, Nunziata and Quintini 
(2001), a significant number also show higher than average levels of inward FDI (e.g. Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland) – in general, no clear correlation emerges by comparing the data 
on shares of world FDI and employment protection levels. 
6 See Smith (1987), Horstmann and Markusen (1987) and (1992).  For a comprehensive survey on 
multinationals and FDI we refer to Caves (1996). 
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employment is less flexible may therefore benefit from potential advantages obtained by 
the commitment power that such inflexibility implies7. 
We use a two-period oligopoly model, in which firms’ location decisions depend on 
strategic and flexibility considerations. Our analysis will be driven by two substantive 
questions.  First, do location-specific sources of inflexibility create strategic advantages that 
affect a country’s ability to retain production of internationally mobile firms?  As we 
argued, while this question has remained largely unexplored in the theoretical literature8, 
policy makers often cite strict employment protection as a threat to the anchorage of 
domestic industry.  Second, when can we expect to find strategic clustering in the same 
regions and when is strategic geographical dispersion more likely?  By focussing on this 
question, this paper complements the economic geography literature, which is mainly 
concerned with agglomeration formation in non-strategic set-ups9. 
The model is outlined in Section 2. The non-strategic determinants of location are analysed 
in Section 3, while the strategic implications of inflexibility are discussed in Section 4. 
Section 5 analyses the location decisions of firms and examines the effects of increasing 
globalisation on the strategic incentives to geographical agglomeration. Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2. The model 
Two firms plan to launch new products, which are imperfect substitutes, to be sold in an 
integrated market.  One firm, the Home firm, has its headquarters in the country named 
“Home”, while the other, referred to as the Foreign firm, has its headquarters in the country 
named “Foreign”.  Each has to decide where to locate their production plant: either in 
“Home” or in “Foreign”.  We assume that the fixed costs of setting up a plant are 
sufficiently high to ensure that each firm chooses to have one plant only.  Competition 
takes place during two periods, with firms choosing “market actions” – outputs under 
Cournot and prices under Bertrand competition – in each period.  The respective demand 
functions for the Home and the Foreign firm for period one are given by 
                                                 
7 The effect of adjustment costs on strategic behaviour has been discussed in set-ups without location 
decisions (see Lapham and Ware, 1994; Jun and Vives, 2001). 
8 The strategic effects of production cost differences on location choice have received ample attention in the 
literature (see references in footnote 6). 
9 See, for instance, Krugman (1991) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). 
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*
111 eqqap −−=         (1a) 
1
*
1
*
1 eqqap −−=         (1b) 
In period two, the firms’ respective demand functions are: 
ueqqap +−−= *222         (2a) 
ueqqap +−−= 2*2*2         (2b) 
where 10 <≤ e  is an inverse measure of product differentiation10, and a>0. The Home 
firm’s price and output are denoted by p  and q , respectively.  Variables referring to the 
Foreign firm are starred.  Subscripts 1 and 2 indicate the time period.  In period one, 
demand for that period is observed but there is uncertainty about future demand.  Hence, a 
stochastic component, u , enters the demand function for period two and is defined over the 
support [ , ]u u , with mean Eu=0 and variance 2σ . The uncertainty is resolved at the start of 
period two11. 
As mentioned above, each firm has to choose either Home or Foreign as its production 
location.  We assume that these countries differ in one important respect.  In Home, strict 
labour market regulations, inspired by a concern for employment protection, prevail.  These 
cause firms to incur hiring and firing costs if, after an unexpected change in demand, they 
want to deviate from the period-one production (and hence employment) level.  By 
contrast, labour market regulations in Foreign are lax, implying that expansions or 
reductions in production can be carried out without incurring any adjustment costs.  The 
profit functions for the Home (π ) and the Foreign firm ( *π ) are respectively given by12 
CRR −+= 21π         (3a) 
**
2
*
1
* CRR −+=π         (3b) 
where tR denotes the Home firm’s revenue in period t (with t=1,2) andC stands for its total 
cost; *tR and 
*C refer to the Foreign firm.  Total costs consist of terms that are location 
specific and others that are not.  They depend on the location chosen by the firm and on 
                                                 
10  Strictly speaking, the model could allow homogeneous products (e=1) with Cournot behaviour, but not 
with Bertrand behaviour. 
11  We restrict the support ],[ uu  to guarantee interior solutions. 
12 We  assume that the discount factor is unity. 
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whether it engages in FDI or not.  The matrix in (4) gives the cost function for each firm in 
each location: 
 Home location Foreign location  
Home firm: C ϕ+Λ++ 21 cqcq  δϕ +++ 21 cqcq  
Foreign firm: C* δϕ ++Λ++ **2*1 cqcq  ϕ++ *2*1 cqcq  
 
(4) 
 
Production costs are not location specific since the marginal cost of production (c) is 
assumed to be the same in both locations.  This allows us to abstract from location-specific 
cost differences.  Adjustment costs (Λ and *Λ ) are, however, location specific; they are 
paid in period two, but only if the firm locates in the inflexible (Home) location.  They are 
denoted by 212 ))(2/( qq −≡Λ λ  for the Home firm and  by 2*1*2* ))(2/( qq −≡Λ λ  for the 
Foreign firm13. The λ-parameter ( 0>λ ) measures the degree of inflexibility.  Firms that 
locate in Foreign, the flexible location, incur no adjustment costs.  The firm’s fixed cost of 
setting up a plant in its native country is denoted by ϕ .  However, if it locates abroad, then 
its fixed costs are δϕ + , with 0>δ .  In other words, δ  represents the costs associated 
with FDI.  These may, for instance, be due to the costs incurred in dealing with foreign 
languages, foreign laws and a foreign taxation system14. More generally, δ can be thought 
of as reflecting the barriers to the mobility of capital, and will therefore shrink as the degree 
of market integration increases.  
Firms play a two-period three-stage game, acting simultaneously in each stage.  The 
sequence of decisions is shown in figure 1.  In period one, production locations, Home (H) 
or Foreign (F), are chosen (stage one).  There are four possible location equilibria: two in 
which both firms choose the same location, (H,H) and (F,F), and two in which firms 
choose a different location, (H,F) and (F,H).  For each location pair, the first letter refers to 
the Home firm’s location choice, whereas the second indicates the Foreign firm’s location 
choice.  No FDI occurs in the (H,F)-equilibrium, while both firms engage in FDI in the 
                                                 
13 This adjustment cost specification is standard in the literature.  Other (e.g., linear, asymmetric) 
specifications would make the analysis technically more tedious without changing the qualitative results (see 
Hamermesh (1996, Ch.6) for a textbook survey of different employment adjustment cost specifications). 
14 This was first formalised by Hirsch (1976). 
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(F,H)-equilibrium.  In stage two, period-one actions are determined given demand for 
period one but with uncertainty about demand in period two.  In period two, the uncertainty 
is resolved and firms choose market actions after having observed actual demand for that 
period (stage three).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
In this model, a firm’s location decision is influenced both by non-strategic and strategic 
factors.  The non-strategic aspects of the production location choice are examined first. 
 
3. The non-strategic dimension of the location decision 
To focus on the non-strategic location determinants, we initially abstract from strategic 
behaviour by considering the limit case of e=0 in which one firm’s product is sufficiently 
different from its rival’s that each firm effectively becomes a monopolist.  In the absence of 
strategic behaviour, only cost and flexibility considerations will determine firms’ location 
choices. 
The location choice of a Foreign monopolist is simple: it will always choose to produce in 
Foreign since this choice entails maximum flexibility without incurring the cost of FDI.  
For a Home monopolist, the location decision involves a trade-off between the costs of FDI 
and the flexibility benefits associated with producing in Foreign.  Due to demand 
uncertainty, the firm anticipates it will face adjustment costs in Home, while there will be 
no adjustment costs when it produces in Foreign.   
Note that there is a critical level of uncertainty above which the Home monopolist will 
choose to produce in Foreign and below which it will choose to locate in Home.  This 
critical 2σ -level decreases in the degree of labour market inflexibility in Home (λ) and 
increases in the degree of international capital immobility (δ ). 
 
4. Strategic implications of employment protection 
When products are substitutes, i.e. e>0, firms behave as duopolists and their location 
decisions involve both strategic and non-strategic considerations.  Solving the game 
backwards, in this section we explore the strategic implications of employment protection 
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at fixed locations (location choice is discussed in section 5).  Since firms interact differently 
under Cournot and under Bertrand competition, we study the strategic implications of the 
production location in both forms of oligopoly.  For expositional clarity, we explain the 
nature of the strategic effects in detail using the case in which each firm produces 
domestically, that is, the Home firm produces in Home and the Foreign firm in Foreign 
(i.e., (H,F)).  The strategic behaviour in the other possible location equilibria will be 
discussed at the end of each subsection, using table 1, which reports the strategic term in all 
possible location combinations.  
 
4.1. Cournot competition 
Firms’ production locations affect their market actions.  We first consider period two, in 
which locations and period-one outputs have already been chosen.  Period-two reaction 
functions under Cournot competition are obtained by maximising period-two profits, 2π  
and *2π , with respect to outputs. When each firm produces domestically, (i.e., in the (H,F)-
case), we have  Λ−−= 222 cqRπ  and *2*2*2 cqR −=π .  Firms’ respective second-period 
reaction functions are given by  
( )λλ ++−+= 2/)( 1*22 qequAq   with caA −≡   (5a) 
2/)( 2
*
2 equAq −+=         (5b) 
Expressions (5a) and (5b) clearly suggest that a firm’s location has implications for its 
flexibility.  The  Home firm’s reaction function responds less to unexpected demand shocks 
than its rival’s does ( uquq ∂∂<∂∂ // *22  from (5a) and (5b)).  The firm in Home is also less 
responsive to changes in rival output ( 2/)2/( ee <+ λ ).  In other words, the labour market 
inflexibility in Home affects the slope of the Home firm’s second-period reaction function.   
Finally, due to adjustment costs, the Home firm’s reaction function depends positively on 
its own past output, as captured by the term in 1q . 
We now turn to stage two.  Being uncertain about the demand in period two, firms 
simultaneously determine their outputs for period one by maximising total expected profits 
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with respect to first-period outputs.  With ),,,( *22
*
11 qqqqππ =  and ),,,( *22*11** qqqqππ = ,  
first-order conditions are given by15 
0)]/([ 1
*
2*
21
=+ dqdqEE qq ππ        (6a) 
0)]/([ *12
**
2*1
=+ dqdqEE qq ππ        (6b) 
Subscripted variables denote partial derivatives.  In (6a) and (6b), the second term on the 
left-hand-side captures the strategic effects.  The strategic term in (6a) is positive 
( 02*
2
<−= qqπ  and 0/ 1*2 <dqdq ), implying that the firm in Home strategically over-
produces in period one (or, 0
1
<qEπ ). By choosing a high output level in period one, the 
Home firm is forced to keep its production in the next period at a relatively high level, since 
changing its production then is costly16.  This commitment to keep production high in 
period two forces the rival firm to cut back its output.  Meanwhile, there is no strategic 
behaviour by the firm in Foreign (i.e., the strategic term is zero, since, from expressions 
(5a) and (5b), 0/ *12 =dqdq ).  
Evidently, the (H,F)-case is not the only possible location combination that can arise. The 
upper half of table 1 presents the strategic terms for both firms under Cournot behaviour for 
all possible location combinations.  If both firms engage in FDI, (F,H), only the Foreign 
firm strategically over-produces in period one.  If both firms produce in Foreign, (F,F), 
neither firm acts strategically.  Finally, if both firms produce in Home, (H,H), then each 
firm behaves strategically and over-produces in period one.   
 
4.2.Bertrand competition 
With Bertrand competition firms’ market actions are now prices (see figure 1).  Nesting the 
case with Bertrand competition in the model outlined in section two requires inverting the 
demand system given in expressions (1a)-(1b) and (2a)-(2b).  Thus, we obtain 
)( *111 eppq −−= βα  and  veppq +−−= )( *222 βα    (7a) 
)( 1
*
1
*
1 eppq −−= βα  and veppq +−−= )( 2*2*2 βα    (7b) 
                                                 
15 From the envelope theorem we know 0*22 *
22
==
qq
ππ , and thus 0**
22
== qq EE ππ . 
16 Diagrammatically, the Home firm’s expected second-period reaction function has shifted out. 
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with )1/( ea +≡α , )1/(1 2e−≡β  and )1/( euv +≡ .  
Like under Cournot, we first concentrate on the case in which each firm produces 
domestically (i.e., the (H,F)-case). 
Starting with the final stage of the game, the second-period price reaction functions are 
given by 
( ) ( ))2(/)1(),())(1( *2*1112 βλββλββλβαβλ +++−+++= peppqcvp   (8a) 
( ) βββα 2/2*2 epcvp +++=        (8b) 
for the Home and the Foreign firm respectively17.  The Home firm’s price reaction function 
responds more to unexpected demand shocks than its rival’s ( vpvp ∂∂>∂∂ // *22  from (8a) 
and (8b)).  Since the firm in Home is less flexible in output, unexpected demand shocks 
will be translated in a larger price flexibility.  For the same reason, the Home firm’s optimal 
price is more responsive to changes in its rival’s price (or, 2/)2/()1( ee >++ βλβλ ). The 
Home firm’s past output level enters negatively in its second-period price reaction function.  
As output is sticky in the presence of adjustment costs, a higher output in period one is 
associated with a higher output in period two and therefore with a lower price. This has 
important implications for firms’ price setting in period one, to which we now turn. 
In stage two firms simultaneously set first-period prices, taking into account their effect on 
future prices.  Total differentiation of firms’ expected profits with respect to first-period 
prices yields the first-order conditions for period one, given by18 
0)]/([ 1
*
2*
21
=+ dpdpEE pp ππ        (9a) 
0)]/([ *12
**
2*1
=+ dpdpEE pp ππ        (9b) 
In the (H,F)-case, the strategic term in (9a) is positive ( 0)]/([ 1
*
2*
2
>dpdpE pπ , as shown in 
table 1), which implies that the firm in Home strategically over-prices in period one 
                                                 
17  A firm that faces adjustment costs effectively faces upwards sloping marginal costs in period two.  It is 
well known that increasing marginal cost may lead to problems with the existence of the Bertrand equilibrium 
(for discussion of non-existence of equilibria under price competition, see for instance Tirole (1988), p.214).  
High e-values require low λ-values to ensure existence. We restrict attention to parameter values that ensure 
the existence of the four possible location equilibria. 
18 From the envelope theorem we know 0*22 *
22
==
q
p ππ , and thus 0* *22 == pp EE ππ .  
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( 0
1
<pEπ ).   As a result, in period-one demand for the Home firm’s good and hence its 
output will be low.  It follows that, due to its production inflexibility, in period two the 
Home firm will keep its output low and its price high (see expression (8a)). 
Unlike in the Cournot case, the firm in Foreign also has an incentive to behave 
strategically. More specifically, that firm strategically under-prices (i.e., since 
0)]/([ *12
*
2
<dpdpE pπ , as reported in table 1, 0* *2 >pEπ  from (9b)).  This is because it 
benefits from a high rival price in period two and can achieve this by cutting its price in 
period one.  The lower Foreign  price reduces the Home firm’s output in period one and this 
raises its price in period two.  Furthermore, even though it is fully flexible, the strategic 
effect (per unit output) for the firm in Foreign is larger in absolute value than that for the 
firm in Home.  Both the Home firm’s strategic over-pricing and the Foreign firm’s strategic 
under-pricing in period one, guarantee that the Home firm’s period-one production remains 
low.  This will push up both firms’ expected prices in the next period19.  
So far, only the (H,F)-case has been discussed.  In the (F,H)-case, the Home firm (now 
located in the flexible Foreign location) will act strategically by under-pricing in period 
one, while its Foreign rival (now located in Home and hence inflexible in output) will 
choose to over-price. If both firms produce in Foreign, (F,F), neither firm has a strategic 
incentive. If both firms produce in Home, (H,H), then both firms will strategically under-
price in period one (see table 1): even though a concern for high future prices gives each 
firm an incentive to keep its first-period production low (by overpricing in period one), it 
creates an even greater incentive for firms to keep their rival’s first-period production low 
(by underpricing in period one)20. 
[Table 1 about here] 
5.  Location patterns 
We now turn to stage one, in which firms simultaneously choose their production location.  
Taking  the rival’s production location as given, each firm simply selects the location that 
                                                 
19 Diagrammatically, the strategic behaviour of both firms causes the second-period reaction function of the 
Home-firm to shift out. 
20  The (H,H)-case refers to a situation in which both firms incur adjustment costs.  Vives and Jun (1999) 
explore the strategic incentives for symmetric (i.e., each facing the same adjustment costs) firms, calculating 
Markov perfect equilibria.  Their results are consistent with the results in our (H,H)-case, obtained here in a 
two-period game.  Their analysis does not include the case in which only one firm faces adjustment costs (our 
(H,F) and (F,H) case) and is not concerned with firms’ location choices. 
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yields the highest expected profits.  To explain how firms’ location choices are determined, 
it will prove useful to decompose expected maximised profits ( πE ) as 
∫ −+= uu duufuE )())(( 00 ππππ       (10) 
In expression (10) the first term, )(0 Euππ ≡ , denotes deterministic profits with 
Φ−=θπ 0 ; θ  is deterministic operating profit and Φ  is the fixed costs incurred by the 
firm, which depends on whether the firm locates in its domestic economy ( ϕ=Φ ) or 
abroad ( δϕ +=Φ ).  The second term in (10) represents the expected profit gain from 
demand shocks.  Because profits are convex in u, this term is non-negative and increasing 
in 2σ .  In fact, we are able to write 20 )())(( γσππ =−∫uu duufu , where γ  reflects the 
firm’s ability to exploit unexpected demand shocks.  Thus, expected maximised profits are 
Φ−+= 2γσθπE .  Given the costs of FDI, δ , locations are determined with each firm 
bearing in mind deterministic operating profits, θ , as well as expected profit gains from 
demand shocks, 2γσ .  
The value of γ  depends, among other things, on the location combination.  Obviously, for 
both firms the ability to exploit demand shocks is higher in ),( FF  than in ),( HH .  
Furthermore, a firm’s γ  is smallest when it is inflexible and its rival is fully flexible.  
Conversely, a firm’s γ  is largest when it is flexible and its rival is located in the inflexible 
location: it then is the only firm that can fully adjust to unexpected shocks.  The ranking of 
the γ -parameter in the different location combinations is the same under Cournot and 
Bertrand competition and is given by 
HFHHFFFH γγγγ >>>        (11a) 
for the Home firm, and by 
FHHHFFHF **** γγγγ >>>        (11b) 
for the Foreign firm, where the first superscript refers to the location of the Home firm and 
the second one indicates the location of the Foreign firm.    
The value of θ  also depends on the location combination.  Note that, since the strategic 
interactions in Cournot competition differ from those under Bertrand behaviour, the ranking 
 12
of the θ -values will be different for each type of oligopoly.   Under Cournot competition, 
the Home firm’s deterministic operating profits at the different location combinations are 
ranked as follows 
FHHHFFHF θθθθ >>>        (12a) 
while the ranking for the Foreign firm is given by 
HFHHFFFH **** θθθθ >>>        (12b) 
This θ -ranking is determined by the strategic behaviour of firms21.  In ),( HH , both firms’ 
first-period strategic overproduction (see table 1) does not yield any future output 
advantage, but merely results in a lower future price.  Hence, deterministic operating profits 
are lower for both firms than in ),( FF , when firms do not act strategically.  However, 
given the rival’s location choice, a firm always attains higher deterministic operating profits 
by committing to high output; it obtains a future gain in market share if its rival is flexible 
( FFHF θθ >  and FFFH ** θθ > ) and avoids a future loss in market share if its rival is 
inflexible ( FHHH θθ >  and HFHH ** θθ > ). 
Under Bertrand competition, HHFF θθ >  because in ),( HH  both firms strategically 
underprice, resulting in lower prices in both periods (while there is no strategic price setting 
in ),( FF ).  Furthermore, we have HFHH θθ > .  In words, the inflexible (Home) firm’s 
deterministic operating profits are higher if the Foreign rival is inflexible too.  To 
understand why, first note that a firm always strategically underprices when it faces an 
inflexible rival.  Thus, the Foreign firm will underprice both at ),( HH  and ),( FH . But, its 
strategic aggressiveness, which harms the Home firm, will be strongest at ),( FH , when it 
is itself flexible.  Hence, under Bertrand we always have the following ranking of 
deterministic operating profits for the Home firm 
HFHHFF θθθ >>         (13a) 
The position that FHθ  takes in this ranking depends on the level of λ .  As long as the 
degree of employment protection (λ) is not too high, FFFH θθ > .  But, as λ increases, FHθ  
                                                 
21 In fact, this θ-ranking only depends on strategic effects.  Consider the hypothetical situation in which, given 
firms’ location choices, first-period market actions are not observed.  Then, in what is often called an “open-
loop” equilibrium, a firm’s second-period action cannot be contingent on first-period market actions.  In this 
 13
falls and eventually, at very high λ, HHFH θθ < .  Similarly, we have the following ranking 
for the Foreign firm 
FHHHFF *** θθθ >>         (13b) 
with the position of HF*θ  in this ranking depending on λ and with FFHF ** θθ >  for low to 
moderately high levels of λ ; as λ  keeps rising HF*θ  starts to fall and eventually we have 
HHHF ** θθ < at very high values for λ.  
While θ and γ depend for each form of oligopoly on the location combination (with the 
rankings given above), they also depend on the exogenous parameters: the degree of 
employment protection (λ), the product differentiation parameter (e) and the market size 
( caA −≡ ).  Together with these parameters, firms’ location choice will also depend on the 
FDI-cost, δ , and the level of uncertainty, 2σ . Since the analysis of firms’ location 
decisions involves many unwieldy algebraic expressions, graphs are used to ease the 
exposition.  Without loss of generality, A is normalised to one.  The figures are depicted in 
),( 2 λσ -space, which means that they are drawn at given values of δ and e. 
In order to highlight the importance of δ in explaining the type of location pattern that 
emerges, we will distinguish between two different cases.  First, we shall focus on a 
situation in which firms incur a significant cost of FDI (section 5.1).  In that context there is 
a natural tendency for firms to locate domestically, thereby avoiding the high FDI-costs.  
We refer to the circumstances in which the Home firm produces in the inflexible Home 
location as “domestic anchorage”.  Formally, this occurs in the equilibria ),( FH and 
),( HH .  The extent to which strategic behaviour affects domestic anchorage is examined 
in section 5.1. Second, we shall explore how increasing degrees of globalisation (in the 
form of falling values of δ) influences location patterns (section 5.2).  In particular, we shall 
investigate when strategic agglomeration – i.e., firms producing in the same location 
(formally, ),( HH and ),( FF ) for strategic reasons only – will emerge if firms can choose 
their production locations on a global level playing field. 
In our analysis, we will also point out the effects of product differentiation (e) on location.  
From section 3 we know that Cournot and Bertrand competition both converge to the 
                                                                                                                                                     
hypothetical benchmark, firms cannot act strategically and the θ-values for every location combination would 
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monopoly case at e=0.  As e increases, the strategic effects become stronger and the two 
types of oligopolistic behaviour give rise to divergent location patterns. The figures are 
drawn for e=0.75, which brings out clearly the differences in location patterns between the 
two market structures.  In contrast to the FDI-cost, the degree of product differentiation 
tends not to affect location patterns in a qualitatively significant way. We will briefly 
comment on the effects of e at the end of each subsection.  Hence, we cover all the 
qualitatively different cases that arise with different parameter combinations. 
 
5.1. Domestic anchorage 
Suppose that the fixed costs associated with FDI are high enough for the Foreign firm never 
to choose to locate in the Home country.  Then, any potential strategic advantage of 
locating in Home would be dominated by the FDI-costs and hence the firm will, even under 
certainty, produce in Foreign (as uncertainty rises, the attractiveness of the Foreign location 
increases). Given that the Foreign rival produces in Foreign, we then need to examine 
where the Home firm will set up its plant.  Figure 2 shows the location pattern that emerges 
in ),( 2 λσ -space.  The equilibrium location combinations under Cournot and under 
Bertrand are indicated by superscripts C and B respectively22. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Since competition is tougher under Bertrand than under Cournot behaviour, price 
competition makes it harder for firms to carry the costs of FDI. Based on these 
considerations only, one would therefore expect the area with domestic anchorage to be 
larger under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.  In fact, it is clear from figure 2 that 
the opposite is true: the region in which domestic anchorage occurs is larger under Cournot 
(areas I and II) than under Bertrand competition (area I only).  This seemingly 
counterintuitive result can be explained by the strategic considerations underlying firms’ 
location decisions23.  Under Bertrand competition, given rival production in Foreign, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
be the same.  For a discussion of the open-loop equilibrium, we refer to Tirole (1988, p.325-326). 
22 In the figures, the maximum value for λ is limited to ensure the existence of all possible equilibria.  At 
e=0.75, λ-values smaller than (approximately) 2.5 are needed for the existence of the (H,F) and (F,H) 
equilibria under price competition (see also footnote 17).  Under quantity competition, values for λ do not 
need to be restricted.  However, nothing changes qualitatively at λ-values above those depicted. 
23 In fact, if firms do not behave strategically in stage two, and hence θ takes the same (open-loop) value at 
each location combination (see footnote 21), the area with domestic anchorage is larger under Bertrand then 
under Cournot competition. 
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Home firm is, from a strategic point of view, better off producing in Foreign ( BFF ),( in 
area II) than in Home ( HFFF θθ > , see expression (13a)).  By producing in Foreign, it 
avoids the massive first-period price undercutting by its rival that would occur if the Home 
firm were to produce in Home.  In contrast, under Cournot competition, the Home location 
holds strategic advantages ( FFHF θθ > , see (12a)), implying that the Home firm will 
produce domestically (giving (H,F)C) in area II.   
As product differentiation increases (i.e. as e falls), strategic behaviour is diminished.  As a 
result, the area with domestic anchorage shrinks under Cournot competition whereas it 
expands under Bertrand competition.  Importantly, the area with domestic anchorage is 
always largest under Cournot behaviour. 
 
5.2. Globalisation and strategic agglomeration 
The process of globalisation implies that capital mobility increases.  In our model this is 
captured by falling FDI-costs (δ ).  As barriers to capital mobility are progressively 
lowered, other location equilibria, beside (H,F) and (F,F), start to emerge.  Figures 3 and 4 
show the location pattern under quantity and price competition respectively. Even a brief 
glance at these figures confirms our previous finding that domestic anchorage remains 
strongest in industries with Cournot behaviour: the region in which the Home firm 
produces in Home is much larger under Cournot (areas Ia+Ib in figure 3) than under 
Bertrand  (area I in figure 4).   
With increasing globalisation, the cost of FDI (δ ) falls and so it is easier for firms to invest 
abroad.  Thus, the cost to the Home firm of acquiring flexibility by investing in Foreign is 
now lower.  In figures 3 and 4, the threshold uncertainty locus below which the Home firm 
produces domestically is now lower than in figure 2.  The area in which the Home firm is 
located in Home has shrunk (areas Ia and Ib in figure 3; area I in figure 4), meaning that 
domestic anchorage is less easily sustained, while FDI from the Home firm into the Foreign 
location becomes relatively more important.  In both figures this is reflected in an 
enlargement of area II, in which (F,F) is the unique equilibrium.  Increased globalisation 
reduces the critical level of uncertainty above which firms produce in  Foreign  to obtain 
high production flexibility. 
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When low FDI costs are combined with low uncertainty, strategic considerations in the 
location decision become relatively more important. Under Cournot competition this 
strategic concern encourages inward FDI at the inflexible location (in area Ib in figure 3), 
leading to the (H,H)-equilibrium.  The Foreign firm actually has to jump a barrier and set 
up its plant in the Home location to avoid ending up in the worst possible strategic position 
( HFHH ** θθ > , see expression (12b)).  The (H,H)-equilibrium is an example of strategic 
agglomeration, in the sense that the agglomeration would not occur in the absence of 
strategic behaviour.   
Under Bertrand, globalisation combined with low uncertainty can lead to FDI by the Home 
firm as it tries to locate in the strategically favourable flexible Foreign location (resulting in 
(F,F)).  As shown in figure 4, provided that the level of employment protection in Home 
(λ ) is sufficiently high, the (F,F)-equilibrium occurs even at certainty ( 02 =σ ); this too is 
an example of strategic agglomeration.  In this case, the Home firm is willing to incur the 
FDI-cost purely for strategic reasons ( HFFF θθ > , see expression (13a)).   
 
[Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
 
As globalisation deepens and δ  falls further, regions in which domestic anchorage prevails 
become smaller still.  In the limit, with complete globalisation ( 0=δ ), firms effectively 
lose their nationality.  The respective location patterns that then occur under quantity and 
under price competition are shown in figures 5 and 6.  Even then,  firms may want to locate 
in the inflexible Home location.  In fact, at sufficiently low levels of uncertainty, (H,H) is 
the unique equilibrium under Cournot competition.  Moreover, (H,H) can also be an 
equilibrium (together with (F,F))  under Bertrand competition, but only at very high 
degrees of employment protection.  This (H,H)-equilibrium is also an example of strategic 
agglomeration because, at high λ , HFHH ** θθ > ; given that the Home firm produces in 
Home, the Foreign firm sets up production in Home too, thus avoiding an unfavourable 
strategic position. 
 
[Figures 5 and 6 about here] 
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The location effects of deepening globalisation prove to be relatively robust to changing 
degrees of product differentiation.  It is worth mentioning that as product differentiation 
increases (e falls), strategic agglomeration still occurs, but only at lower levels of 
uncertainty. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
We have explored how differences in labour market flexibility affect location decisions 
when future demand is uncertain and firms act strategically.  When demand uncertainty is 
very high, firms will cluster in countries where the labour market is relatively flexible, thus 
avoiding costly redundancy packages during economic slowdowns and expensive overtime 
payments or hiring costs in economic booms.  Among countries with a high degree of 
capital mobility, this location pattern may even prevail at relatively low levels of 
uncertainty.  
However, when firms act strategically, they may be willing to forego flexibility and 
produce in countries where the labour market is relatively inflexible in order to obtain 
strategic advantages.  This is the case when the firms engage in Cournot behaviour.  Under 
quantity competition an inflexible location allows a firm to commit to high future output, 
which makes the inflexible location more attractive at low levels of uncertainty.  This 
strategic advantage helps to maintain domestic anchorage of firms in locations with strict 
labour regulations.  Under price competition however, a firm located in the inflexible 
country faces aggressive pricing from its flexible rival in period one. As a result, the 
inflexible location is unfavourable both from a strategic and a flexibility perspective.  
Hence, both strategic and flexibility incentives work against domestic anchorage under 
Bertrand competition.  
We have shown that deepening globalisation can lead to a greater tendency for the 
development of strategic agglomeration. This is the case under both Cournot and Bertrand 
competition.  Under Cournot competition, firms facing low FDI-costs cluster in the 
inflexible location when uncertainty is low (this can also occur under Bertrand competition 
at very high levels of employment protection and when uncertainty is very low). Such 
clustering has however a prisoner’s dilemma character with firms all producing higher 
output and enjoying less flexibility than they would in a location with lower labour 
adjustment costs. Under Bertrand competition, when strategic  agglomeration occurs, it 
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does so mainly in the flexible location as firms flee the strategically unfavourable inflexible 
location.  
When formulating the policy lessons from this analysis, one should proceed with caution.  
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that the level of employment protection is 
exogenous.  This is a reasonable assumption since the political unwillingness to change 
employment protection regulations, once these are in place, is often strong.  It does not, 
however, preclude policy makers from using location-dependent fiscal incentives to 
increase the attractiveness of their region. Our analysis suggests that countries with strict 
labour regulations will find it less difficult to achieve domestic anchorage of key industries, 
by using fiscal incentives, when firm behaviour is approximated by Cournot rather than by 
Bertrand competition24.   
Finally, we have not derived optimal employment protection levels in this paper.  This 
would require taking into account the link that typically exists between employment 
protection and labour costs: employment protection tends to push up labour cost – not least 
because it strengthens workers’ bargaining power – which would in turn affect a location’s 
attractiveness for investors.  Whether and how a government should design its labour 
standards optimally in order to achieve domestic anchorage and to maximise its FDI-inflow 
is a question left for future research. 
                                                 
24 Whether firms’ behaviour is better described by Cournot or by Bertrand competition would need to be 
empirically investigated on an industry-by-industry basis.  There exists a substantial empirical literature on 
this issue (for a textbook survey, see Martin (2002), Ch.7). 
Stage 1: Firms choose location
Possible combinations:
(F,F) ; (H,F) ; (F,H) ; (H,H)
Stage 2: Firms choose 1st-period market actions:
• (q1, q*1) if Cournot competition
• (p1, p*1) if Bertrand competition
Stage 3: Firms choose 2nd-period market actions:
• (q2, q*2) if Cournot competition
• (p2, p*2) if Bertrand competition
PERIOD 1
Uncertainty
PERIOD 2
Certainty
Figure 1: The sequence of decisions
Table 1: The strategic terms in all possible location combinations 
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Figure 2: The location pattern with high FDI-costs
(δ =0.01; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 4: The location pattern under Bertrand competition with globalisation
(δ=0.005; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 3: The location pattern under Cournot competition with globalisation
(δ =0.005; e=0.75; A=1)
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Figure 5: The location pattern under Cournot competition with complete globalisation
(δ =0; e=0.75; A=1)
I: (H,H)
II: (H,H);(F,F)
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Figure 6: The location pattern under Bertrand competition with complete globalisation
(δ =0; e=0.75; A=1)
I: (H,H);(F,F)
II: (F,F)
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